Bibliographic record
Abstract
Consider a seller and a buyer bargaining over the price of an agricultural product in a developing economy. Think of the following common bargaining deal: the seller tries to persuade the buyer to accept a higher price and, in return, give the buyer a deal (i.e., extra units of the product for free). Why doesnÕt the seller just give the buyer a lower price instead of the deal? This paper provides an answer to this question. Although price can apparently replicate the use of quantity bonus (i.e., the free extra units), we argue that price bargaining per se limits the extent to which price can be used. Such bargaining deals are used because the seller can post them but cannot post prices. We explain why these sellers can post quantity bonuses. We give a condition under which the quantity bonus can replicate the equilibrium that would have obtained if the seller could directly post the price. We offer here a theory of bargaining deals.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.010 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.014 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".