Public versus Private Retirement Pensions: A Stackelberg Differential Game
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper studies the dynamic interaction between a representative employer and the government, where both play roles in providing retirement pensions to a group of retirees with heterogenous wages. Public pension expenses drive the evolution of public debt, which can be positive or negative (a Social Security trust fund) in the long run. The relative sizes of public and private pensions affect income distribution. Social Security discriminates in favor of low-paid employees, while the employer provided pension, which is assumed to be integrated with Social Security, counteracts this tilt by favoring highly-paid employees. The Social optimum, understood as the central planner outcome or the government first best, can be attained in the decentralized scenario if the degree of Social Security integration is optimally chosen by the government. In addition, pensions obtained by retirees from a flat percentage private pension are compared to the pensions obtained by assuming a private plan that is optimally integrated with Social Security.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".