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Record W2106478571 · doi:10.5555/2772879.2773233

Approximately Strategy-proof Mechanisms for (Constrained) Facility Location

2015· article· en· W2106478571 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceImpossibilityFacility location problemMechanism designComplement (music)Metric (unit)OddsMathematical optimizationSpace (punctuation)IncentiveMechanism (biology)Mathematical economicsMathematicsMicroeconomicsEconomicsOperations management

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Mechanism design for facility location (or selection of al-ternatives in a metric space) has been studied for decades. While strategy-proof, efficient mechanisms exist for uncon-strained, one-dimensional, single-facility problems, guaran-tees of strategy-proofness and efficiency often break when allowing: (a) multiple dimensions; (b) multiple facilities; or (c) constraints on the feasible placement of facilities. We address these more general problems, providing several pos-sibility/impossibility results with respect to individual and group strategy-proofness in both constrained and uncon-strained problems. We also bound the incentive for manipu-lation in median-like mechanisms in settings where strategy-proofness is not possible. We complement our results with empirical analysis of both electoral and geographic facility data, showing that the odds of successful manipulation, and more importantly, the gains and impact on social welfare, are small in practice (much less than worst-case theoretical bounds).

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.960
Threshold uncertainty score0.641

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.137
GPT teacher head0.259
Teacher spread0.122 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations17
Published2015
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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