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Record W2108235989 · doi:10.1257/mic.20150020

Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome

2016· article· en· W2108235989 on OpenAlexaff
Nicola Lacetera, Bradley Larsen, Devin G. Pope, Justin Sydnor

Bibliographic record

VenueAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics · 2016
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionOutcome (game theory)Computer scienceVickrey auctionDifferential (mechanical device)Auction theoryMicroeconomicsEconomicsPhysics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Auction design has been studied extensively; however, within a given design, does the process of how an auction is conducted matter as well? We address this question by looking for heterogeneity in the performance of auctioneers in English auctions. We analyze over 850,000 wholesale used car auctions and find significant differences across auctioneers in outcomes for otherwise similar cars. The performance heterogeneities are stable across time and correlate with subjective evaluations by the auction house. We discuss the mechanisms driving differential performance and find evidence suggesting a role for tactics that generate bidder excitement or urgency. (JEL D44, D82, L62)

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.037
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.011
Threshold uncertainty score0.052

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.037
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0040.002
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0110.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.038
GPT teacher head0.362
Teacher spread0.324 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations33
Published2016
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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