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Record W2113636442 · doi:10.1109/infocom.2006.255

Asymptotics of Efficiency Loss in Competitive Market Mechanisms

2006· article· en· W2113636442 on OpenAlexaff
Jia Yuan Yu, Shie Mannor

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicGame Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBounded functionComputer scienceMathematical optimizationFunction (biology)Zero (linguistics)Mathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract — We consider the loss of efficiency in competitive market mechanisms used to allocate network resources. We model large heterogeneous populations of users assuming that each user has a random utility function. We show that if the utility functions are bounded, the competitive equilibrium will be nearly as efficient as the social optimum with high probability as the number of users increases. This is the case for inelastic capacity as well as elastic capacity, under some standard assumptions. This result extends to a network setup where sources and destinations are picked at random. If, however, the utility functions are not bounded, then the loss of efficiency does not converge to zero. Collaborating simulations are also presented. I.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.667
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.028
GPT teacher head0.324
Teacher spread0.296 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2006
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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