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Record W2116221922

INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN ELIMINATION CONTESTS

2006· preprint· en· W2116221922 on OpenAlexaff
J. Atsu Amegashie

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2006
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Guelph
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCONTESTInformation transmissionBenchmark (surveying)MicroeconomicsEconomicsAdversaryComplete informationPolitical scienceComputer scienceComputer securityLaw
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

I consider a two-stage elimination contest with uninformed and informed players. Informed players can signal their type to future uninformed opponents through their efforts in the first stage. Relative to the benchmark case of complete information, I find that an informed player exerts a higher effort in stage 1, if the uninformed future opponent is weaker than him. Conversely, he exerts a lower effort, if the uninformed opponent is stronger than him. This result is consistent with a conjecture in Rosen (AER, 1986). Intuitively, informed players may want to scare future uninformed opponents by exerting higher efforts in earlier rounds. However, trying to scare a stronger player may not be a sensible strategy because he might compete very fiercely. In equilibrium, informed players who are stronger than uninformed players separate from informed players who are weaker than uninformed players. This result differs from Horner and Sahuguet (2003) where stronger informed players pool with weaker informed players.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.914
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.043
GPT teacher head0.378
Teacher spread0.335 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designOther design
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2006
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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