[특집] 한반도 군비통제 및 군측: 각종 국제레짐과의 연결 및 활용

The Korean Peninsula, despite the collapse of the Cold War on a global scale, still remains the last remant of the Cold War. North and South Korea have maintained hostile relations and military tension, and have continued to race armaments. Therefore our impending tasks and missions are the dissolution of Cold War system and the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. In Particular it is very important to the end of arms race and the achievment of disarmament on the Korean peninsula. It is impossible to maintain peace and to attain unification without military confidence-building and disarmament between the two Koreas. North and South Korea agreed already on the some principles of the arms control and disarmament by on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North(Basic Agreement) and Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean which was concluded in 1992. The Articles 12 of Basic Agreement provides that the two sides shall discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize disarmament by 'South- North Joint Military Commission' And the two Koreas promise not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons, and to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes in Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula..Meanwhile the United Nations system which play the role of the central forum community and arms control and disarmament agreements form international arms control and disarmament Those regimes provide the important standards and contexts for the arms control and disarmament on the Korean Peninsula as well as is worthy to utilize for it. The arms control and disarmament regimes are as follows: UN General Assembly and the organs which deals with disarmament, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Conference on disarmament in Geneva (CD), Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC), Biological Weapons Convention(BWC), Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and Ottawa Convention, and Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR). In this context, the main purpose of this paper is to examine a way of the linkage with and utilization of regimes for the arms control and disarmament on the Korean Peninsula, and to research also the possibility and conditions of utilizing those regimes. In order to attain this goals, I will study to utilize UN system as means to realize the conventional arms control and disarmament, prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by NPT, exterminate chemical and biological weapons by CWC and BWC, prohibit anti-personnel mines by CCW and Ottawa Convention, and regulate missiles by MTCR. Among the arms control and disarmament regimes, NPT, BWC and CD are acceded by North and South Korea together. While South Korea alone join in CWC and UN Register of Conventional Arms, all two Koreas take part in CCW, Ottawa Convention and MTCR. Taking account of UN membership of North and South Korea, we can think about utilization of the machinery which deals with disarmament within the UN framework. But it is. undesirable that the special matters of the Korea Peninsula is dealt with within UN system. It will bring about internationalization of the Korean. problems and cause unnecessary exhaustive contention and confrontation-diplomacy between the two Koreas. UN system, despite limitations like that, must contribute to arms control and disarmament on the Korean Peninsula. CD which is the sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiation in community can serve to give universality upon arms control and disarmament on Korean Peninsula. Also It is possible to secure the transparency of attack arms transfer by UN Register of Conventional Arms. International regimes like CWC and BWC can be utilize as a useful means to prohibit chemical and biological weapons on the Korean Peninsula. CWC is the first disarmament agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under universally applied control. It has the effective and powerful verification regime like the challenge inspections which allows each State Party to have an inspection conducted at any facility or location in any other State Party without right of refusal at short notice. South Korea have announced intention to join CCW Protocol Ⅱ, but rejected accession to Ottawa Convention for military confrontation between the two koreas and usefulness of anti-personnel mines in DMZ. South Korea must, however, take part in Ottawa Convention for a huge wave of public opinion against landmines. Their military utility has been increasingly questioned. Ottawa Convention provide that each party undertakes to destroy all its stockpiled anti-personnel mines as soon as possible but not later that four years the entry into force of the convention for that state party. Each party also undertakes to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its judisdiction or control not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the convention. The aims of the MTCR is to restrict the proliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500kg payload at least 300km, as well as systems intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction(WMD). Rigorous application of MTCR Guidelines to the Korean peninsula can bring about many problems and obstacles. Therefore in order to utilize MTCR for missile control on the Korean Peninsula, a set of conditions must be met. It is necessary to assure North Korea' Security and to establish the fair and universal standard for missile control in the Northeast Asia. Research and development of rocket for peaceful purposer like space programs shall be protected In Conclusion, arms control and disarmament regimes is worthy of utilization for the arms control and disarmament on the Korean Peninsula. First, International regimes contribute to grant the universality and legitimacy on inter- Korean arms control and disarmament. second, It can offer the objectives, universal standard and framework in process of negotiation and implementation for the arms control and disarmament on the Korean Peninsula. Third, It must play a role of reinforcement and strengthening the arms control and disarmament regimes on the Korean Peninsula through the support and security assurance of powers on it.

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