MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2126586897 · doi:10.1109/gamenets.2009.5137410

Equilibria and convergence of auctions on networks

2009· article· en· W2126586897 on OpenAlexaff
Peng Jia, Peter E. Caines

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionConvergence (economics)Nash equilibriumComputer scienceCombinatorial auctionLimit (mathematics)Mathematical optimizationScheme (mathematics)Network topologyMathematical economicsMathematicsEconomicsMicroeconomicsComputer network

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

First, a quantized progressive second price auction mechanism called UQ-PSP is developed to allocate a divisible resource among arbitrary populations of agents. It is shown that (i) the states (i.e. bid prices and quantities) of the corresponding iterative dynamical auction system converge to a unique quantized (Nash) equilibrium with a common limit price for all agents, and (ii) the dynamics are independent of the initial data. Second, a network based auction is developed where each agent employs a UQ-PSP scheme by observing only their neighbors' bids. The equilibria and convergence properties of this class of distributed auctions are established and are shown to depend on the network topology, and numerical examples are given.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.008
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.003
Threshold uncertainty score0.011

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.008
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0020.002
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0030.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.091
GPT teacher head0.406
Teacher spread0.315 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207