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Record W2126616776 · doi:10.1017/s0003055401242026

The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes. By Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1998. 322p. $90.00.

2001· article· en· W2126616776 on OpenAlexaff
D. Marc Kilgour

Bibliographic record

VenueAmerican Political Science Review · 2001
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsWilfrid Laurier University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsVotingSimple (philosophy)Presidential electionPower (physics)PhenomenonPresidential systemPolitical scienceLaw and economicsPositive economicsSociologyLawEconomicsEpistemologyPoliticsPhilosophy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In the 2000 U.S. presidential election, the Electoral College, for the first time in a long while, did not smoothly and seamlessly select the popular vote winner. This phenomenon did not figure in the immediate controversy over the election, but it may yet have an effect, and part of that effect may be long-overdue attention to the rules for aggregating individual votes into a group decision. Those who design institutions for group decision making, or who study such institutions, may be reminded that aggregation procedures can fail to reflect important principles, even principles as simple and funda- mental as one person, one vote.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.013
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.004
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScience and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.859
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0130.004
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.003
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.030
GPT teacher head0.280
Teacher spread0.250 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2001
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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