Hospitals Quality Competition and Specialization Choice under Regulated Price
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
Non-price competition strategy is a major health policy concern in many countries. This paper studies the treatment specialization choice and quality level competition among hospitals. We extend a two-stage spatial duopoly model, with the partially altruistic providers firstly choosing specialization and then determining quality level when the treatment price is set exogenously by central planner. The first best conclusion of quality is that two hospitals always invest equally much is quality, which suggests the “quality weapon” between hospitals in reality. Then, specialization-quality equilibrium gives the conclusion that quality competition introduces a centrifugal effect in the specialization game. And with the unmatched cost between patients disease and hospital’s specialization is lower, hospitals' equilibrium quality level and specialization differentiation will decrease.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it