Signalling reputation in international online markets
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract Although online technology enables young and small firms to gain access to buyers in foreign markets efficiently, it does not overcome the liability of being an unknown seller among a sea of largely unknown firms. In order to internationalize effectively through online markets, such firms need to establish an online reputation within a context where there are a large number of competitors, most of (or all of) are relatively unfamiliar to customers. The purpose of this article is to explore how they might do so. Drawing on economics‐based signalling theory as well as past research in the areas of strategic management, marketing, and MIS, we hypothesize that firm‐controlled reputation signals with credible commitments—price, advertising, and umbrella branding—will impact reputational performance and moderate the impact of user‐generated reputation signals. We test the hypotheses using data collected about software products sold on the Web site Download.com. Our results show that signalling by advertising and umbrella branding affects reputational performance. The article provides insights about signalling in online markets for managers developing reputation‐building strategies, as well as for international entrepreneurship researchers. Copyright © 2009 Strategic Management Society.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it