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Record W2131467577 · doi:10.1287/mksc.1050.0129

Coupons Versus Rebates

2007· article· en· W2131467577 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueMarketing Science · 2007
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicConsumer Market Behavior and Pricing
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsReservationProduct (mathematics)BusinessKey (lock)AttractivenessAdvertisingPaymentControl (management)Significant differenceMicroeconomicsComputer scienceMarketingEconomicsComputer securityFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper examines a key difference between two promotional vehicles, coupons and rebates. Whereas coupons offer deals up front, with the purchase of the product, rebates can be redeemed only after purchase. When consumers experience uncertain redemption costs, this difference translates to a difference in when uncertainty is resolved. With coupons the uncertainty is resolved before purchase; with rebates the uncertainty is resolved after purchase. As a result, we show that rebates are more efficient in surplus extraction but coupons offer more finetuned control over whom to serve. We identify the conditions under which each is optimal, and these conditions turn on the gap between “low” reservation price consumers’ valuations and their highest redemption costs. Rebates are optimal when this gap is large; coupons tend to be optimal otherwise. Risk aversity on the part of consumers reduces the attractiveness of rebates, as does the delay between rebate redemption and rebate payment, but the latter if and only if consumers are more impatient than the seller. These observations match up well with what we know about the use of these promotional vehicles in the real world.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.347
Threshold uncertainty score0.497

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.024
GPT teacher head0.271
Teacher spread0.247 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it