Bibliographic record
Abstract
In this paper some coherent explanations are suggested for tariff reductions and substitution of non‐tariff barriers for tariffs, taking into account both organized special interests and unorganized consumer interests. The focus is on how the presence of informed consumers affects the political equilibrium choice of trade policy. Three effects are identified that interact with each other as an incumbent government substitutes a NTB for a tariff, and, among other things, it is found that an increase in foreign competition will not cause the government to substitute NTBs for tariffs, but a rise in the government's valuation of political contribution might do so. JEL Classification: F13, D72 Ce mémoire propose des explications cohérentes de la réduction des droits de douane et de la substitution de barrières non‐tarifaires (BNT) pour les droits de douane dans un cadre d'analyse qui tient compte des groupes d'intérêt organisés et de la désorganisation des groupes de consommateurs. L'analyse insiste sur l'impact de consommateurs informés sur les choix politiques qui sous‐tendent la politique commerciale. Le mémoire identifie trois effets (effet de bienêtre social, effet de lobbying, effet d'information) qui jouent au moment où un gouvernement substitue une barrière non‐tarifaire à un droit de douane. On montre, entre autres choses, qu'un accroissement de la concurrence étrangère n'engendre pas de substitution de BNT pour un droit de douane, mais qu'un accroissement de la valeur accordée aux contributions électorales peut fort bien avoir cet effet.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.006 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.047 | 0.005 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".