The democratic deficit: Paul Martin and parliamentary reform
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract: Paul Martin's plan to reform parliamentary government in order to eliminate the so‐called democratic deficit calls for greater independence for individual mps and the House of Commons vis‐à‐his the government. In this article, we first examine what is required to make the reforms work according to his measures of success. We then consider why he has restricted his assault on the democratic deficit to the reform of Parliament. Third, we consider whether parliamentary reform is sufficient to address the discontents and criticisms of Canadian government that have given rise to the perceived democratic deficit. We conclude that the Martin plan, except for the review of government appointments, is sound from the perspective of representative democracy but that it will be successful in addressing the democratic deficit only to the extent that the prime minister and his reform‐minded colleagues are able to convince Canadians that citizen participation in the institutional processes of reformed parliamentary government can be meaningful. Sommaire: Le projet qu'a M. Paul Martin de réformer le gouvernement parlementaire afin d'éliminer le soi‐disant déficit démocratique exige une plus grande indé‐pendance des députés individuels et de la Chambre des communes à l'égard du gouvemement. Dans le présent article, nous examinons tout d'abord les exigences nécessaires pour que les réformes fonctionnent selon ses mesures de succés. Nous examinons ensuite pourquoi M. Martin a restreint son attaque du déficit démocratique à la seule réforme parlementaire. Troisiémement, nous examinons si la réforme parlementaire est suffisante pour remédier aux insatisfactions et critiques envers le gouvemement canadien qui ont engendré le déficit démocratique perçu. Nous con‐cluons que le plan de M. Martin, à I'exception de la revue des nominations gouveme‐mentales, est solide du point de vue de la démocratie représentative. Il ne parviendra cependant à s'attaquer au déficit démocratique que dans la mesure où le Premier ministre et ses collégues soucieux de réforme seront capables de convaincre les Canadiens que la participation des citoyens aux processus institutionnels d'un gouverne‐ment parlementaire réformé peut être constructive.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it