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Tensions entre rationalité technique et intérêts politiques: l'exemple de la mise en œuvre de la<i>Loi sur les agences de développement de réseaux locaux de services de santé et de services sociaux</i>au Québec

2007· article· fr· W2138267132 on OpenAlexafffundabout
Damien Contandriopoulos, Raymond Hudon, Élisabeth Martin, Daniel W. Thompson

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian Public Administration · 2007
Typearticle
Languagefr
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicPolitical Influence and Corporate Strategies
Canadian institutionsUniversité Laval
FundersCanadian Institutes of Health ResearchU.S. Public Health Service
KeywordsPoliticsHumanitiesSociologyProcess (computing)Political scienceWelfare economicsPublic administrationComputer scienceLawArtEconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Sommaire: L'objet de cet article est constitué par les processus décisionnels entourant la mise en œuvre de la Loi sur les agences de développement de réseaux locaux de services de santé et de services sociaux (Loi 25). Nous entendons mettre en lumière les stratégies des groupes ou institutions de diverses natures qui ont fait valoir leurs préférences et ont tenté, avec un succès inégal, d'influencer les décisions relatives à cette réforme majeure de la structure du système de santé québécois. Au plan théorique, nous nous appuyons principalement sur les modèles d'analyse du lobbying qui, depuis les travaux fondateurs de Milbrath (1960, 1963), présentent cette pratique comme un processus fondamental d'échange d'information. Selon les données colligées dans les retranscriptions d'entrevues, les stratégies observées correspondent effectivement aux caractéristiques constitutives du lobbying et, dans quelques situations, à celles du patronage. La combinaison de ces divers éléments révèle que la mise en œuvre de la Loi 25 s'avère être avant tout un processus proprement politique. Ainsi, furent relégués au second plan les arguments techniques qui composaient initialement les objectifs de la Loi. Abstract: This article focuses on the decision‐making processes surrounding the implementation of Bill 25, Quebec's Act Respecting Local Health and Social Services Network Development Agencies. Our intention is to shed light on the strategies of the various groups or institutions that expressed their preferences and attempted, with varying degrees of success, to influence decisions with respect to this major reform of the Quebec health system structure. On a theoretical level, we are relying mostly on the models for analysing the lobbying process, which, since the seminal work of Milbrath (1960, 1963), have essentially presented this practice as a process for exchanging information. Based on the information gathered in the re‐transcribed interviews, the strategies observed are actually in line with the constitutive characteristics of lobbying and, in some situations, those of patronage. Ultimately, the combination of these various elements makes it obvious that the implementation of Bill 25 was, first and foremost, a clearly political process. The technical arguments on which the initial objectives of the act were centred have thereby been relegated to the backstage.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.004
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Scholarly communication
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.355
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0040.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0020.002
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.031
GPT teacher head0.331
Teacher spread0.300 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations17
Published2007
Admission routes3
Has abstractyes

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