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Record W2139467293

Honesty preferences and audit policy

2014· article· en· W2139467293 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Ruey-Ji Guo, Yenpao Chen, Hung-Shu Fan

Bibliographic record

VenueDecision Science Letters · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsHonestyAuditIncentiveBusinessAffect (linguistics)AccountingEconomicsPsychologyMicroeconomicsSocial psychology
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

A B S T R A C T This study examines how preferences for honesty affect two - period audit policy. We categorize the audited as either fully honest (i.e. the ethical) or self-interested and rational (i.e. the economic) to deal with the issue of audit policy. As a result, we find the conditional audit policy will be an optimal audit policy only if the incentive for the economic to cheat is sufficiently large and the proportion of the ethical in all audited is relatively moderate,. Otherwise, the conditional audit policy will be dominated by other audit policy. These results suggest that firms are likely able to design a more efficient audit policy if they take into account the honesty preferences of the audited.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.008
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.820
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.008
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.003
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0020.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.061
GPT teacher head0.388
Teacher spread0.327 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designOther design
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2014
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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