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Record W2144107722

Bargaining with Uncertain Value Distributions

2009· article· en· W2144107722 on OpenAlexaff
Huan Xie

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsConcordia University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBargaining powerMicroeconomicsValue (mathematics)Ex-anteEconomicsDistribution (mathematics)IncentiveRevenueBargaining problemEconometricsMathematicsStatistics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper studies a bargaining model in which the seller is uncertain about which distribution the buyer's values are drawn from. The distribution of the buyer's values is fixed across periods, while the buyer's values are drawn independently from the distribution each period. In the classical model of repeated bargaining where the buyer's value is drawn from a commonly known distribution and fixed across periods, the high-value buyer has a strong incentive to conceal his value, and the seller loses most of her bargaining power. An important question is whether adding a layer of uncertainty makes the high-value buyer more willing to accept high-price offers and improves the seller's revenue. We find this to be the case as long as the seller's ex ante beliefs are sufficiently optimistic.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.011
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.030
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.011
Threshold uncertainty score0.056

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0110.030
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.004
Scholarly communication0.0040.007
Open science0.0020.002
Research integrity0.0030.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.086
GPT teacher head0.398
Teacher spread0.312 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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