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Record W2148324316 · doi:10.1109/pst.2008.25

Mimicry Attacks Demystified: What Can Attackers Do to Evade Detection?

2008· article· en· W2148324316 on OpenAlexafffund
H. Güneş Kayacık, A. Nur Zincir‐Heywood

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection
Canadian institutionsDalhousie University
FundersNational Institute for Materials ScienceMitacsKillam TrustsDalhousie University
KeywordsExploitPreambleComputer scienceComputer securityMimicryBuffer overflowDetectorFocus (optics)Anomaly detectionChannel (broadcasting)Computer networkTelecommunicationsArtificial intelligence

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Mimicry attacks have been the focus of detector research where the objective of the attacker is to generate an attack that evades detection while achieving the attackerpsilas goals. If such an attack can be found, it implies that the target detector is vulnerable against mimicry attacks. In this work, we emphasize that there are two components of a buffer overflow attack: the preamble and the exploit. Although the attacker can modify the exploit component easily, the attacker may not be able to prevent preamble from generating anomalous behavior since during preamble stage, the attacker does not have full control. Previous work on mimicry attacks considered an attack to completely evade detection, if the exploit raises no alarms. On the other hand, in this work, we investigate the source of anomalies in both the preamble and the exploit components against two anomaly detectors that monitor four vulnerable UNIX applications. Our experiment results show that preamble can be a source of anomalies, particularly if it is lengthy and anomalous.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.858
Threshold uncertainty score0.697

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.021
GPT teacher head0.245
Teacher spread0.224 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designOther design
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations26
Published2008
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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