MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2150554277 · doi:10.1287/mksc.1100.0601

Search and Choice in Online Consumer Auctions

2010· article· en· W2150554277 on OpenAlexaff
Ernan Haruvy, Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc

Bibliographic record

VenueMarketing Science · 2010
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of AlbertaMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionPrice dispersionMicroeconomicsSearch costEconomicsVickrey auctionForward auctionGeneralized second-price auctionVickrey–Clarke–Groves auctionIncentiveAuction theory

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Price dispersion in simultaneous online auctions is a puzzle in light of the relatively low search costs required to find the lower price. Much of this price dispersion appears to be due to a lack of switching by bidders between auctions, which in turn could be due to inertia related to search costs. We identify some of the influencing factors through a controlled field experiment involving pairs of simultaneous auctions. Keeping the sellers and the goods sold identical between two auctions, we vary auction design features between and within pairs including shipping cost, open reserve, secret reserve price, and duration, and we provide bidders with incentives to search. We use a choice model that examines individual choice between pairs of simultaneous auctions. We find that within-pair price dispersion is substantial and that prices and auction choice by bidders are indeed related to search costs. We find strong inertia in auction choice and find that this effect significantly interacts with time left in the auction. Although individuals do not always choose a lower-priced auction, they are more likely to do so when search costs are low or search incentives are high.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.023
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.005
Threshold uncertainty score0.024

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.023
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0030.002
Open science0.0000.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0050.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.074
GPT teacher head0.424
Teacher spread0.351 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueMarketing ScienceSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207