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Record W2151005154 · doi:10.1093/analys/ant048

Luck, Value and Commitment

2013· article· en· W2151005154 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueAnalysis · 2013
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicPhilosophical Ethics and Theory
Canadian institutionsTrent University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsLuckConsequentialismMoralityNormative ethicsValue (mathematics)EpistemologyMoral philosophySociologyEthical theoriesPhilosophySubject (documents)Value theoryEthical theorySection (typography)

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams contains versions of papers presented at a conference entitled Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams held at the University of Leeds in the summer of 2009.1 As the book’s title suggests, it does not pretend to provide systematic or definitive expositions of Williams’s work. Instead, the articles collectively illustrate just how wide-ranging and deep Williams’s influence has been, even among those philosophers who disagree fundamentally with some of his claims and who admit to finding some of his arguments less than persuasive. The volume contains an introduction by the editors and 11 papers, arranged across five sections, the first three of which reflect central themes in Williams’s work. The section ‘Ethical Theory’ includes a paper by Brad Hooker (‘Theory versus Anti-Theory in Ethics’) in which he challenges arguments (including some of Williams’s) for the ‘anti-theory’ position in ethics and a paper by Philip Pettit (‘The Inescapability of Consequentialism’) that targets Williams’s objections to consequentialism in particular. Susan Wolf’s paper (‘One Thought Too Many: Love, Morality, and the Ordering of Commitment’) explores what might be involved in upholding or withdrawing an unconditional commitment to morality. The section ‘Moral Luck’ contains three papers, each of which I will discuss at greater length below and all reflecting on the ways in which what we are responsible for and whether our actions are justified can be subject to moral luck. The section ‘Reasons and ‘Ought’’ includes a paper by Michael Smith (‘A Puzzle About Internal Reasons’) in which he defends and develops an internalist account of reasons, in part by showing how imagination can contribute to an agent’s deliberating correctly, and one by Ulrike Heuer (‘Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons’) that argues that Williams’s understanding of ‘thick’ ethical concepts and reasons internalism are incompatible. The third paper in this section (John Broome’s ‘Williams on Ought’) is the most strictly exegetical of the papers, and it focuses on Williams’s account of the normative concept ‘ought’. The last two papers are each granted their own section. Jonathan Dancy’s paper (‘McDowell, Williams, and Intuitionism’) is prompted by Williams’s criticism of the kind of intuitionist epistemology he thinks McDowell is committed to; Gerald Lang argues in ‘Discrimination, Partial Concern, and Arbitrariness’ that speciesism has little in common with racism or sexism.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.616
Threshold uncertainty score0.996

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0050.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.026
GPT teacher head0.233
Teacher spread0.206 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it