What Determines the Length of a Typical Canadian Parliamentary Government?
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract.In this paper we examine the length of political tenure in Canadian federally elected parliamentary governments since 1867. Using annual data on tenure length, we categorize the distribution of governing tenures in terms of a hazard function: the probability that an election will arise in each year, given that an election has not yet been called. Structuring the election call as an optimal stopping rule, we test whether that distribution responds predictably to characteristics of the political and/or economic environment. The results of using the continuous Cox and Gompertz models together with the discrete semi-parametric proportional hazard model suggest that governing parties in Canada do engage in election timing and that the only economic policy measure that is used consistently in conjunction with election timing is fiscal expenditure. Résumé.Dans cet ouvrage, nous examinons la durée d'un régime parlementaire canadien depuis la Confédération de 1867. Nous utilisons des données annuelles et nous représentons la distribution de durée de vie d'un gouvernement par une fonction de hazard, c'est-a-dire, la probabilité qu'une élection soit déclenchée durant une année spécifique étant donné qu'elle ne l'a pas encore été jusqu'à présent. Nous modélisons un déclenchement d'élection par une règle d'arrêt optimal el nous testons si la distribution dépend des caractéristiques de l'environnement politique et économique tel que prédit selon la théorie. Nous résultats basés les modèles de hazard proportionnel continu de type Cox et Gompertz et discret semi-paramétrique révèlent que les partis fédéraux au pouvoir au Canada choisissent le moment opportun pour déclencher une élection. De plus, les dépenses fiscales sont la seule variable de politique économique qui y soit systématiquement relié.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.017 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.004 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".