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Record W2152932702 · doi:10.1017/s0008423906040741

Rawlsian Reasonableness: A Problematic Presumption?

2006· article· en· W2152932702 on OpenAlexaff
Shaun P. Young

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian Journal of Political Science · 2006
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicPolitical Philosophy and Ethics
Canadian institutionsYork University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsLiberalismClassical liberalismPhilosophyPresumptionDemocracyLiberal democracyEconomic JusticeArgument (complex analysis)Political scienceHumanitiesPoliticsEpistemologyLaw and economicsSociologyLaw

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract.The notion of “reasonableness” has been a prominent feature of liberalism since the latter first emerged as a coherent philosophical project. Indeed, arguably, reasonableness is the core value animating the liberal outlook. Such a claim is especially true with respect to the conception of political liberalism promoted by John Rawls. In essence, the viability of Rawlsian political liberalism is dependent upon the “reasonableness” of both the public conception of justice and the individuals who must live under its constraints. However, this reliance on reasonableness poses a number of potential difficulties for Rawls's argument, particularly insofar as his belief in the ability of his conception to secure the conditions essential to establishing and sustaining a just and stable liberal democracy is premised upon a number of questionable claims and expectations regarding the reasonableness of individual attitudes and behaviour. The primary task of this essay is to identify and explain a number of concerns that render suspect the plausibility of Rawls's conclusions regarding the extent to which it is realistic to presume the reasonableness of individuals and, by extension, the ability of his conception to achieve its stated goal. Résumé.La notion du “ raisonnable ” constitue un aspect important du libéralisme depuis l'émergence de ce dernier en tant que projet philosophique cohérent. En fait, le raisonnable est sans doute la valeur principale qui anime le point de vue libéral. Ceci est particulièrement vrai de la conception du libéralisme politique défendue par John Rawls. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls dépend essentiellement du caractère raisonnable de la conception publique de la justice, ainsi que des individus qui doivent vivre selon ses contraintes. Toutefois, l'importance du raisonnable dans ce concept soulève un certain nombre de problèmes dans le raisonnement de Rawls. Il est persuadé que ses idées garantissent les conditions essentielles pour établir et maintenir une démocratie libérale, mais ce postulat s'appuie sur de nombreuses affirmations et espérances discutables quant au caractère raisonnable des attitudes et comportements individuels. Cette dissertation s'efforcera principalement d'identifier et d'expliquer un certain nombre de problèmes remettant en cause la plausibilité des conclusions de Rawls. On étudiera tout particulièrement dans quelle mesure il est réaliste de présumer du caractère raisonnable des individus et, par extension, de la capacité de la conception de Rawls à atteindre ses objectifs.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.016
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.029
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.016
Threshold uncertainty score0.085

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0160.029
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.002
Bibliometrics0.0020.002
Science and technology studies0.0040.034
Scholarly communication0.0070.011
Open science0.0030.005
Research integrity0.0050.010
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0070.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.033
GPT teacher head0.319
Teacher spread0.286 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations21
Published2006
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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