E¢ cient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning
Bibliographic record
Abstract
We study how the presence of multiple participation opportunities coupled with in- dividual learning about payos aects the ability of agents to coordinate e¢ ciently in global coordination games. Two players face the option to invest irreversibly in a project in one of many rounds. The project succeeds if some underlying state variableis positive and both players invest, possibly asynchronously. In each round they receive informative private signals about �, and asymptotically learn the true value of �. Players choose in each period whether to invest or to wait for more precise information about �. We show that with su¢ ciently many rounds, both players invest with arbitrarily high probability whenever investment is socially e¢ cient, and delays in investment disappear when signals are precise. This result stands in sharp contrast to the usual static global game outcome in which players coordinate on the risk-dominant action. We provide a foundation for these results in terms of higher order beliefs.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.013 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".