Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract. In normative political theory, the position called dualism maintains that the two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principle. The most influential proponent of dualism is John Rawls, and his theory of “justice as fairness” has recently been criticized by the monists Liam Murphy and G.A. Cohen. In this paper I argue that if Rawlsians are going to salvage his dualistic framework from the challenge raised by Murphy and Cohen, they will have to reject Rawls's “political conception” of justice in favour of the partially comprehensive view defended in A Theory of Justice. I contend that dualism is only a viable approach to normative political theory if both aspects of the dualistic framework are emphasized. Résumé. Dans la théorie politique normative la position du “ dualisme ” maintient que, sur le plan pratique, les deux problèmes primordiaux de la conception institutionnelle et de la conduite personnelle, nécessitent, au niveau fondamental, deux types différents de principe pratique. L'adepte le plus influent du dualisme est John Rawls dont la théorie de “ la justice comme équité ” a été critiquée récemment par les monistes Liam Murphy et G.A. Cohen. Dans cet article, je maintiens que si les partisans de Rawls comptent sauver son schéma dualiste du défi lancé par Murphy et Cohen, il va falloir qu'ils rejettent la conception politique de la justice de Rawls en faveur de la position partiellement compréhensive défendue dans “ Une théorie de la justice ”. De plus, je maintiens que le dualisme est une approche viable en théorie politique normative uniquement si les deux aspects du schéma dualiste sont mis en valeur.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.010 | 0.016 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.019 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".