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Record W2161499774 · doi:10.1177/096834450100800102

Britain Gets Its Way: Power and Peace in Anglo-American Relations, 1838-1846

2001· article· en· W2161499774 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueWar in History · 2001
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicAmerican Constitutional Law and Politics
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsNavyPower (physics)AdversaryLawDiplomacyPolitical scienceFace (sociological concept)HistoryEconomic historyPolitical economyPoliticsSociology

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

From the perspective of twenty-first-century America, it seems natural to assume that no other nation has ever been able seriously to threaten the continental states with its navy or military. The assumption that US geography has always deterred such pressure, however, ignores the early Victorian era. In the 1830s and 1840s, one nation could and did pose a credible threat to the United States: Great Britain. As the world's supreme naval and financial power, Britain had the means to protect and advance its interests in the face of American belligerence. Ultimately, Britain's strength deterred the United States from turning the tensions of 1838-46 into war. True, by this time Britain could never invade and reconquer its former American colonies. But it was never in its interest to go to war with the US. Anglo-American commercial relations were quite profitable, and peace kept them so. Furthermore, the British preferred a divided America, fighting over slavery and states' rights, to one united against an external enemy. Britain's goal was peace, but the methods it used to avoid war with the US in this period did not look particularly peaceful. Especially under Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston, preserving the peace did not equate with yielding in diplomatic battles. Rather, a `strong stance' warned the US away from confrontations of a more lethal kind. Interestingly, the prospect of a British invasion through Canada played only a relatively small part in this deterrence. More important was the ability of the Royal Navy, with new gunnery and steam vessels, to strike at the populous and prosperous cities of the eastern and southern coasts of the US. Britain knew the possibilities for mayhem, as did the US government and some, at least, of the American public. Besides Britain's technical advantages, its funding and political support for the navy were second to none. While the US struggled in vain to finance new ships and fortifications, the British cabinet could rest assured that if the Royal Navy required more funding, it would get it. The British government counted on the navy's strength to intimidate the Americans in controversies over the Caroline and McLeod affairs, the Maine boundary and the Oregon territory. Palmerston's personal style of `gunboat diplomacy' may have encouraged this course, but he and his colleagues did worry that the political system of the United States might lead it to start a war neither side really wanted: the fevered American press and people might push the government to some act the British could not tolerate. Britain used the Royal Navy to signal the dire consequences of such an act and forced the American government to resist popular pressure. Geography in these cases was not enough to shield the US; Britain's strong stance preserved its existing interests and maintained peace.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.924
Threshold uncertainty score0.990

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.017
GPT teacher head0.269
Teacher spread0.252 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it