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Record W2163613205 · doi:10.1109/cdc.2008.4738808

Probabilistic analysis of the rapid convergence of a class of progressive second price auctions

2008· article· en· W2163613205 on OpenAlexaff
Peng Jia, Peter E. Caines

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionProbabilistic logicNash equilibriumConvergence (economics)Mathematical optimizationValuation (finance)Mathematical economicsMechanism (biology)Computer scienceMathematicsEconomicsMicroeconomicsArtificial intelligence

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

A quantized progressive second price auction mechanism called ADQ-PSP is presented which improves upon the performance of the so-called Q-PSP mechanism presented in. Q-PSP mechanism was developed for the fast convergence properties that can be proven for it subject to the assumption that all agents share similar demand (i.e. marginal valuation) functions. For the ADQ-PSP mechanism applied to agent populations with randomly distributed demand functions it is shown in this paper that the states (i.e. bid prices and quantities) of the corresponding dynamical systems rapidly converge with high probability to a quantized (Nash) equilibrium with a common price for all agents. This property holds for ensembles containing populations which have significantly different demand functions. Furthermore, the convergence rates are independent of the number of quantization levels. Finally, the ¿-efficiency of the quantized equilibria is established and numerical examples are given.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.717
Threshold uncertainty score0.992

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.004
Science and technology studies0.0000.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0090.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.082
GPT teacher head0.352
Teacher spread0.270 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations6
Published2008
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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