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Record W2163888186 · doi:10.1109/securware.2010.39

Defaming Botnet Toolkits: A Bottom-Up Approach to Mitigating the Threat

2010· article· en· W2163888186 on OpenAlexaff
Thomas C. Ormerod, Lingyu Wang, Mourad Debbabi, Amr Youssef, Hamad Binsalleeh, Amine Boukhtouta, Prosenjit Sinha

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicAdvanced Malware Detection Techniques
Canadian institutionsConcordia University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBotnetComputer securityThe InternetComputer scienceInternet privacyWorld Wide Web

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Botnets have become one of the most prevailing threats to today's Internet partly due to the underlying economic incentives of operating one. Botnet toolkits sold by their authors allow any layman to generate his/her own customized botnet and become a botmaster; botnet services sold by botmasters allow any criminal to steal identities and credit card information; finally, such stolen credentials are sold to end-users to make unauthorized transactions. Many existing botnet countermeasures meet inherent difficulties when they choose to target the botmasters or authors of toolkits, because those at the highest levels of this food chain are also the most technology-savvy and elusive. In this paper, we propose a different, bottom-up approach. That is, we defame botnet toolkits through discouraging or prosecuting the end-users of the stolen credentials. To make the concept concrete, we present a case study of applying the approach to a popular botnet toolkit, Zeus, with two methodologies, namely, reverse engineering and behavioural analysis.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.004
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.010
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Bench or experimental · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.004
Threshold uncertainty score0.020

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0040.010
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0030.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.005
Scholarly communication0.0030.006
Open science0.0020.005
Research integrity0.0030.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.013
GPT teacher head0.254
Teacher spread0.241 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designBench or experimental
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations19
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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