Collapsing Arguments for Facts and Propositions
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Philosophical logic on slingshot arguments about facts and propositions; not about research practice.
This is a philosophical analysis of arguments about facts and propositions, not research itself.
Analytic philosophy of logic/propositions and definite descriptions, not contemporary research practice.
Abstract
Kurt Gödel argues in “Russell’s Mathematical Logic” that on the assumption that, contrary to Russell, definite descriptions are terms, it follows given only several “apparently obvious axioms” that “all true sentences have the same signification (as well as all false ones).” Stephen Neale has written that this argument, and others by Church, Davidson, and Quine to similar conclusions, are of considerable philosophical interest. Graham Oppy, responding to this opinion, says they are of minimal interest. Falling between these is my opinion that implications of these arguments for propositions and facts are of moderate philosophical interest, and that these arguments provide occasions for reflection of possible interest on fine lines of several theories of definite descriptions and class–abstractions.
Stored with the screening record, where it is evidence for the labels above.
The record
- Venue
- The Australasian Journal of Logic
- Topic
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Field
- Psychology
- Canadian institutions
- University of Toronto
- Funders
- —
- Keywords
- QuineEpistemologyAxiomArgument (complex analysis)PhilosophyClass (philosophy)LinguisticsMathematics
- Has abstract in OpenAlex
- yes