Collapsing Arguments for Facts and Propositions
Pourquoi ce travail est-il dans la base ?
Une base qui oublie comment elle a trouvé un travail ne peut pas être vérifiée. Voici les voies qui ont admis celui-ci.
Le tri à trois modèles
les 1 000 travaux triés →Les trois modèles l'ont jugé hors champ.
Philosophical logic on slingshot arguments about facts and propositions; not about research practice.
This is a philosophical analysis of arguments about facts and propositions, not research itself.
Analytic philosophy of logic/propositions and definite descriptions, not contemporary research practice.
Résumé
Kurt Gödel argues in “Russell’s Mathematical Logic” that on the assumption that, contrary to Russell, definite descriptions are terms, it follows given only several “apparently obvious axioms” that “all true sentences have the same signification (as well as all false ones).” Stephen Neale has written that this argument, and others by Church, Davidson, and Quine to similar conclusions, are of considerable philosophical interest. Graham Oppy, responding to this opinion, says they are of minimal interest. Falling between these is my opinion that implications of these arguments for propositions and facts are of moderate philosophical interest, and that these arguments provide occasions for reflection of possible interest on fine lines of several theories of definite descriptions and class–abstractions.
Conservé avec la notice de tri, où il sert de preuve aux étiquettes ci-dessus.
La notice
- Revue
- The Australasian Journal of Logic
- Thématique
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Domaine
- Psychology
- Établissements canadiens
- University of Toronto
- Organismes subventionnaires
- —
- Mots-clés
- QuineEpistemologyAxiomArgument (complex analysis)PhilosophyClass (philosophy)LinguisticsMathematics
- Résumé présent dans OpenAlex
- oui