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Record W2168894972 · doi:10.1111/1475-3995.t01-1-00335

Alternate Financial Incentives to Regular Credit/price Discounts for Extraordinary Purchases

2001· article· en· W2168894972 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Transactions in Operational Research · 2001
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicSupply Chain and Inventory Management
Canadian institutionsUniversity of New Brunswick
Fundersnot available
KeywordsVendorPaymentRevenueOrder (exchange)Promotion (chess)IncentiveBusinessProfit (economics)MicroeconomicsTrade creditEconomicsMarketingFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Temporary trade promotions can take in practice many forms, specially when competitive pressures lead vendors to generate new and creative alternatives to the standard price discount or delay of payment. It is the purpose of this paper to develop the retailer's profit‐maximizing decision‐making strategy when confronted with any one of three such offers. Important issues under consideration are how much of the offer the retailer should pass on to its own customers, the kind of retail promotion needed to accompany the vendor's trade promotion, and what effect these policies have on the retailer's demand for its own products. The economic interpretation of the optimal solution is discussed and some computational experience reported. Included in the latter is the estimation of alternate forms of these offers yielding similar objectives, be they price, length of the discount period, vendor's revenue, special order size, or retailer's benefit.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.806
Threshold uncertainty score0.998

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.002
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0030.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.091
GPT teacher head0.375
Teacher spread0.285 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it