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<scp>Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies</scp>

2009· article· en· W2169063161 on OpenAlexaff
Marc Fleurbaey, Yves Sprumont

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Public Economic Theory · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversité de Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsEgalitarianismSubsidyPublic goodEconomicsMicroeconomicsAxiomContext (archaeology)WelfareSocial WelfareSocial welfare functionMinimaxFunction (biology)PopulationSocial costSocial preferencesPublic economicsMarket economyMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population. We extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when cost shares cannot be negative, i.e., agents cannot receive subsidies from others. We adapt the Maniquet–Sprumont defense of public good welfare egalitarianism to this context. Weakening their Free Lunch Aversion axiom and adding a continuity requirement allows us to characterize the public good welfare maximin social ordering function.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.022
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.004
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.193
Threshold uncertainty score0.858

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0220.004
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0020.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.120
GPT teacher head0.356
Teacher spread0.236 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations4
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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