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Record W2169825920 · doi:10.1109/jsac.2007.070818

Efficiency of Market-Based Resource Allocation among Many Participants

2007· article· en· W2169825920 on OpenAlexaff
Jia Yuan Yu, Shie Mannor

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · 2007
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicGame Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceProbabilistic logicBounded functionResource allocationPopulationMathematical optimizationGame theoryResource (disambiguation)Distributed computingComputer networkMathematical economicsMathematicsArtificial intelligence

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Market mechanisms have been suggested in the last few years as a tool for allocating shared networks resources among several competing users. In this paper, we consider the efficiency loss of such mechanisms in the presence of a large number of users. We model the user interactions as a game with a heterogeneous population of players characterized by random utility functions. If the utility functions are bounded, then the non-cooperative equilibrium are nearly as efficient as the social optimum with high probability when the number of users is large. This efficiency result holds for a single link with a fixed or an increasing capacity. Using a standard probabilistic analysis, we show that the efficiency loss incurred by the market mechanism decreases almost exponentially in the number of users. If, however, the utility functions are not bounded, then the loss of efficiency does not converge to zero. We also provide results for networks by sampling the users at random based on their paths.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.004
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.399
Threshold uncertainty score0.534

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.004
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.003
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0030.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.118
GPT teacher head0.404
Teacher spread0.286 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations7
Published2007
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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