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Record W2170946417 · doi:10.1155/2012/636159

Robust Nash Dynamic Game Strategy for User Cooperation Energy Efficiency in Wireless Cellular Networks

2012· article· en· W2170946417 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueMathematical Problems in Engineering · 2012
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicCooperative Communication and Network Coding
Canadian institutionsSimon Fraser University
FundersNational Natural Science Foundation of China
KeywordsRelayComputer scienceGame theoryNash equilibriumWirelessStochastic gameEfficient energy useComputer networkPerfect informationBase stationWireless networkNon-cooperative gameDistributed computingMathematical optimizationTelecommunicationsEngineering

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Recently, there is an emerging trend of addressing “energy efficiency” aspect of wireless communications. It has been shown that cooperating users relay each other′s information to improve data rates. The energy is limited in the wireless cellular network, but the mobile users refuse to relay. This paper presents an approach that encourages user cooperation in order to improve the energy efficiency. The game theory is an efficient method to solve such conflicts. We present a cellular framework in which two mobile users, who desire to communicate with a common base station, may cooperate via decode‐and‐forward relaying. In the case of imperfect information assumption, cooperative Nash dynamic game is used between the two users′ cooperation to tackle the decision making problems: whether to cooperate and how to cooperate in wireless networks. The scheme based on “cooperative game theory” can achieve general pareto‐optimal performance for cooperative games, and thus, maximize the entire system payoff while maintaining fairness.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.977
Threshold uncertainty score0.719

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.032
GPT teacher head0.241
Teacher spread0.209 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it