A Comparative Analysis of Financing Parties and Elections in Croatia and in Other Countries
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Summary Comparative politics has shown interest in the topic of financing political parties only recently. The reason for this is the fact that a more systematic regulation of financing elections and parties – apart from Sweden where the process of regulation began in the 1960s – started only in the 1970s and 1980s. Namely, the expenditure incurred by party activities in that period increased significantly everywhere, making the traditional sources of party financing such as membership fees, money raised at party rallies and so on, completely inadequate. Since that time the practice of supplementing these scarce party funds through a system of public subsidies of parties and elections from the budget was introduced. The regulation of party financing has not taken the same form in all countries and did not happen at the same time. In the United States, for example, elections are financed mostly from private funds. The expenditure for elections and parties has, however, become a subject of public scrutiny and special auditing, while the financial support limits have been precisely determined. Similar processes have been at work in Canada and Australia as well as in some European countries such as Holland. On the other hand, in Austria, Italy, Germany and Sweden, a system of heavy reliance of parties on the budget subsidies has gradually evolved. Besides the sources of financing, the regulation covers TV promotion of parties and their candidates. In most countries TV coverage for election campaigning cannot be simply bought since it is precisely regulated; all political actors must enjoy equal access to today’s most ubiquitous medium. The exception to the rule are the United States where TV time for election campaigning is up for grabs. And finally, the financing of Croatian political parties is looked into. Unlike in the developed Western countries, financing of parties has not yet been subjected to major regulation. Due to this lack of precise regulation, the flow of party funds is concealed from the public, regarding both its provenance and its spending.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".