The Ongoing War Between the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure and Militant Islamists: Is the Next 9/11 Preventable
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the militant Islamist threat within the United States, to determine whether the current United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure can prevent the next significant terror attack in the homeland, and recommend improvements to the National Counter-Terrorism Structure organization and practices. The first two chapters define militant Islam and explore the likelihood that it remains a persistent threat within the United States. The paper focuses on militant Islamists rather than all ideological threats in the United States and on the most damaging of potential terror attacks. A selection of six terrorist events illustrates the history of militant Islamist actions in the United States from 1993 to 2007, defines the threat, and aids in the analysis and evaluation of the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure later in the paper. Support for a persistent and plausible militant Islamist threat inside the United States and the six-year absence of a significant terror attack in the homeland is shown to be a result of slow, patient militant Islamist planning for an attack more powerful than that of 9/11. Using the defined threat as a foundation, the third chapter describes the existing National Counter-Terrorism Structure comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations. The chapter focuses upon the Structure's policy, procedure, and resource implementation; communications and information sharing; and contingency plans and rehearsals. The fourth chapter analyzes whether the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure can defend the homeland against the next militant Islamist terror attack in the homeland. The analysis uses selected Principles of War from the US Army's Field Manual 3-0 and focuses upon the extent to which national, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations coordinate and share information about known and potential terrorist threats and learn through their examining and rehearsing threat plans and scenarios. This chapter also makes recommendations to improve any problems in the organization and practices of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure discovered during the analysis. The importance of identifying seams in the Structure is seen when looking at the context of the 9/11 terror attacks. Prior to September 2001, a significant seam in the Counter-Terrorism Structure existed because the CIA and FBI did not conduct synchronized information sharing and coordination. That seam aided al-Qaeda on 9/11. Proposed recommendations concerning the National Counter-Terrorism Structure are evaluated with the same Principles of War as was used during the evaluation of the existing structure. The United States is at war in the homeland with militant Islamists- the enemy threat that already exists within our borders. They enter through the porous US borders with Canada and Mexico or are homegrown from citizens and long-term residents of the United States within those same borders. The forces fighting on behalf of the United States are the law enforcement and homeland security organizations who make up the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure. That Structure is comprised of the Department of Homeland Security, Northern Command, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the federal level, similar organizations at the state level, and city and county law enforcement and security personnel at the local level. The addition of new counter-terrorism organizations as well as new and better information sharing and collaboration centers in the United States allows the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure to provide better security than before September 11, 2001. Is it good enough to prevent the next militant Islamist terror attack on the scale of 9/11 within the homeland?
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".