Toronto Ten Years after amalgamation/Toronto Dix Annees Apres la Fusion Municipale
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract This paper reviews what has happened to the City of Toronto 10 years after it was amalgamated. From 1995 to 2003, the Ontario Government made a number of major changes in the way that its municipalities were governed and financed. Some municipalities were forced to amalgamate despite the opposition of their residents. The government also redistributed certain responsibilities of the province to the municipalities through the Local Services Realignment Programme (LSRP). The process is called disentanglement. Since the LSRP led to the cost of many of the shared-cost programmes being shifted to the city, the programme can also be termed downloading. Other major changes include the use of market value for property tax assessment and the provincial government control of education funding for the local school boards. Resume Dans cet article, on examine ce que s'est passe a la Ville de Toronto dix annees apres la fusion municipale. Entre 1995 et 2003, le Gouvernement de l'Ontario a introduit plusieurs changements majeurs dans la facon dans laquelle ses municipalites furent gouvernees et financees. Certaines municipalites furent contraintes a subir une fusion, meme si leurs residents etaient contre. Le gouvernement a egalement redistribue certaines responsabilites de la province vers les municipalites. Ce processus visait une separation plus claire entre la province et les municipalites. Mais le resultat de cette transformation etait que les municipalites ont du assumer les couts de plusieurs programmes qu'autrefois etaient partages--une decentralisation des responsabilites sans un transfert des finances. D'autres changements majeurs incluent l'utilisation de la valeur du marche pour l'evaluation de la taxe sur le foncier and le controle par le gouvernement provincial du financement pour les commissions scolaires locaux. ********** This paper reviews what has happened to the City of Toronto 10 years after it was amalgamated. From 1995 to 2003, the Ontario Government made a number of major changes in the way that its municipalities were governed and financed. Some municipalities were forced to amalgamate despite the opposition of their residents. The government also redistributed certain responsibilities of the province to the municipalities through the Local Services Realignment Programme (LSRP). The process is calleddisentanglement. Since the LSRP lead to the cost of many of the shared-cost programmes being shifted to the city, the programme can also be called downloading. Other major changes include the use of market value for property tax assessment and the provincial government control of education funding for the local school boards. The Organization of Local Government Municipalities, their residents, provincial governments and academics have been concerned with the costs and benefits of a large unified city or megacitycompared with many small and diverse municipalities within a large metropolitan area. The concept of amalgamation involves the voluntary or forced merger of smaller local governments with a larger municipality to forma large metropolitan area. If the municipalities had the power to make their own decisions, theoretically they would select the size of government that would produce municipal goods and services at the lowest possible cost. They could also take advantage of economies of scale through joint buying with other municipalities. Many municipalities within a large urban area may also stimulate competition among the municipalities and this provides a strong incentive to keep costs down. Since different municipalities produce different packages of services and taxes, Tiebout argued that the residents could improve their economic welfare by selecting the municipalities where the services and taxes best fit their preferences (Tiebout 1956: 416-424). Determining the needs and desires of residents in small municipalities is less costly than in large municipalities because there are fewer residents for each elected official. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".