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Record W2195823538 · doi:10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8270

Approximately Revenue-Maximizing Auctions for Deliberative Agents

2021· article· en· W2195823538 on OpenAlexaff
L. Elisa Celis, Anna R. Karlin, Kevin Leyton‐Brown, Chương V. Nguyen, David W. Thompson

Bibliographic record

VenueProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 2021
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
FundersHebrew University of Jerusalem
KeywordsCommon value auctionDeliberationLeverage (statistics)RevenueMicroeconomicsMaximizationMathematical economicsComputer scienceDeliberative democracyUpper and lower boundsMathematical optimizationEconomicsMathematicsArtificial intelligencePolitical scienceFinanceDemocracy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In many real-world auctions, a bidder does not know her exact value for an item, but can perform a costly deliberation to reduce her uncertainty. Relatively little is known about such deliberative environments, which are fundamentally different from classical auction environments. In this paper, we propose a new approach that allows us to leverage classical revenue-maximization results in deliberative environments. In particular, we use Myerson (1981) to construct the first non-trivial (i.e., dependent on deliberation costs) upper bound on revenue in deliberative auctions. This bound allows us to apply existing results in the classical environment to a deliberative environment. In addition, we show that in many deliberative environments the only optimal dominant-strategy mechanisms take the form of sequential posted-price auctions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.004
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.484
Threshold uncertainty score0.524

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.004
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.383
GPT teacher head0.438
Teacher spread0.055 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations9
Published2021
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

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