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Record W2203850281 · doi:10.1109/isc2.2015.7366182

A combinatorial auction for cost reduction in city home health care

2015· article· en· W2203850281 on OpenAlexaff
Zhijie Xie, Chun Wang

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsConcordia University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCombinatorial auctionOrder (exchange)IncentiveBusinessHealth careComputer scienceMicroeconomicsOperations researchMarketingEconomicsFinanceMathematicsBidding

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We propose a combinatorial auction for the allocation of home visits to independent health care practitioners in the setting of city home health care. Given the practitioners' different skill sets, time constraints and costs incurred in order to provide the services, the auction allocate home visits to practitioners such that all planned visits are covered with qualified practitioners and, at the same time, the overall service costs are minimized. We assume a game theoretic setting where practitioners are modeled as self-interested agents. We present a combinatorial auction as the allocation mechanism. We show that the auction is incentive compatible and the individual rational.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.447
Threshold uncertainty score0.218

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.237
GPT teacher head0.472
Teacher spread0.236 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2015
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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