Bibliographic record
Abstract
Canada has contributed to North American strategic defence, and been an ar- dent proponent of strategic stability, since the early Cold War. Though seem- ingly compatible, Canada's involvement in continental strategic defence and advocacy of strategic stability has been nagged by an underlying contradiction. As part of its contribution to the strategic defence of the continent, Canada has tacitly endorsed and facilitated the United States' offensively oriented nuclear strategies. Canada's support of strategic stability, however, has aimed to dis- courage offensive nuclear doctrines and the arms races they have tended to fuel. Given this contradiction, Ottawa might have decided to harmonize its policies, either by abandoning strategic defence roles that have supported of- fensive American nuclear doctrines, or by ceasing to be an advocate of strate- gic stability and strategie arms control. But this has not been the path chosen by successive Canadian government since the mid-1960s. Instead, Canadian governments have opted to accept the contradiction and pursue a two-track approach: for more than four decades, Canada has contributed to continental strategic defences that have aided offensively oriented nuclear strategies, while simultaneously vaunting the value of strategic stability and strategic arms control.Following this two-track approach has served Canadian governments well. It allowed Ottawa to protect Canada and Canadians by emphasizing the futility of nuclear war and arms races. Yet it further permitted the Canadian military to assist the United States in defending North America and in maintaining a credible nuclear weapons posture, one capable of prevailing over common adversaries during a conflict. Since each of these policies and outcomes served the Canadian national interest, Ottawa was determined to avoid developments that exposed the contradictory nature of the two tracks, or that pushed Canada to choose between its commitment to strategic defence and its advocacy of strategic stability. Canadian governments have managed to conceal this contradiction and avoid making such a choice for most of the past four decades. However, there has been one technological development, ballistic missile defence, that has routinely threatened to expose the contradiction and force Ottawa to give precedence to strategic defence over strategic stability, or vice versa. Nonetheless, in spite of the pressure exerted by BMD, Canadian governments preserved the two- track approach; the missile defence issue has not compelled Ottawa to downgrade either its existing commitments to strategic defence or its support of strategic stability and arms control. A question that remains is whether future Canadian governments will be able to preserve this dual approach when the missile defence issue arises again, which is likely to happen within the next few years.This article examines the history and future of Canada's involvement in the strategic defence of North America and advocacy of strategic stability. It begins with an overview of Canada's strategic defence and stability policies during the Cold War and post- Cold War eras, with a particular focus on the politics surrounding Canadian participation in BMD. Next, it analyzes how the government's decision to decline a formal role in BMD in 2005 represented a reapplication of the two-track approach. It concludes with a discussion of the strategic defence and stability options a future Canadian government is likely to face.BALANCING STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STABILITY, 1945-2000Canada's involvement with the strategic defence of North America began in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Convinced that the Soviet Union would soon develop atomic weapons and long-range bombers capable of striking North America, Canada and the United States began planning a joint air defence of the continent in 1946. This planning accelerated in 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated an atomic device and fielded its first intercontinental bomber. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.027 | 0.035 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.015 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.007 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.017 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".