Peace vs. Privacy
Bibliographic record
Abstract
We introduce the paradigm of security through hostility: cloud-based service providers in conflicting jurisdictions are assumed to be non-cooperating, and are used for transmitting encrypted content and corresponding keys through separate but accessible channels among end-users from both jurisdictions. Such separation between content and key can enable effortless user-to-user encrypted communication without any user-managed keys. As an example use-case of this paradigm, we consider encrypted email, which is complicated by the requirement of balancing security and ease-of-use needs. For example, users cannot be expected to manage long-term keys (e.g., PGP key-pair), or understand crypto primitives. We design CherAmi by leveraging existing relationships between a sender and a receiver on an online social networking (OSN) site, and assuming users can use OSN and email providers that are hosted from hostile/non-cooperating jurisdictions. CherAmi can provide integrity, authentication and confidentiality guarantees for selected messages among OSN friends. A confidentiality-protected email is encrypted by a randomly-generated key, and the key is privately shared with the receiver via the OSN site. Our implementation consists of a Thunderbird add-on and a Twitter app; the add-on is available at: https://madiba.encs.concordia.ca/software.html. CherAmi is a client-end solution and does not require changes to email or OSN servers. In this paper, the focus of our discussion includes: the paradigm of security through hostility, and the design, implementation and security analysis of the proposed encrypted email solution. We acknowledge that a user study will be required to validate usability-related features of CherAmi.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.007 | 0.013 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.023 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.011 | 0.022 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.009 |
| Research integrity | 0.007 | 0.012 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.023 | 0.005 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".