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Record W2217069355

Response to the Commentary of Richard W. Moodey

2010· article· en· W2217069355 on OpenAlexaff
Gregory M. Nixon

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of consciousness exploration & research · 2010
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldNeuroscience
TopicEmbodied and Extended Cognition
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Northern British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPreconsciousUnconscious mindConsciousnessPsychologyReading (process)EpistemologyPerspective (graphical)SubconsciousCollective unconsciousHappeningPsychoanalysisPhilosophyLinguistics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

It’s good to see that Richard Moodey readily agrees with my differentiation of experience-in-itself from conscious experience in my first essay, “Panexperientialism”; however, he would also like to differentiate experience-in-itself from non-conscious experience, as well as be more specific with a number of terms that I lumped generically together. I would say that if experience is not conscious experience than it can only be non-conscious (or unconscious or preconscious experience). I cannot conceive of any experience that is neither conscious nor unconscious. We ourselves have created that dichotomy and, though there may be many vague degrees of partially conscious or unconscious experience, surely all experience can be classified within this continuum. Of course “consciousness without a mind” and “experience without an experiencer” seem contradictory on first reading, but, again, I see them as fundamentally equivalent to the idea of non-conscious (unconscious or preconscious) experience, which also seems contradictory on first glance. I presume that being aware, i.e., conscious (if you must), but having no central perspective like that which we refer to as a “mind” is consciousness-without-a-mind or consciousness-without-a-self and I see that as equivalent to non-conscious experience, or close enough to make my point. The same thing applies to experience-without-an-experiencer. Experience is happening but there may be no central entity that is “having” the experience. How is this possible? I maintain that experience is relational; in its early, most rudimentary stages it takes place in what might be described as frictional sensation wherever parts of a dynamic field or system encounter each other, or when parts of two separate dynamic fields or systems encounter each other. Such friction is felt as sensation only locally, at the place where the two foreign elements meet, so there is no central experiencer, yet that local encounter will affect the behaviour of the whole system(s). When such localized sensations become remembered where they occurred and perhaps anticipated, the entire system/field may come to recognize them. At that instant, I would suggest that the amorphous system or field becomes an entity in the world, for that recognition of previously displaced sensation internalizes the feeling as one of belonging to the whole. At that point, experience has created experiencers, and fields have produced entities (that may or may not become organisms). I equate non-conscious experience with “core consciousness” simply because the definition perfectly describes what I mean. Wikipedia (2010) states: “In biological psychology the core consciousness describes a hypothesized level of awareness facilitated by neural structures of most animals that allows them to be aware of and

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.003
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Bench or experimental · Consensus signal: Bench or experimental
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.118
Threshold uncertainty score0.408

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.003
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.111
GPT teacher head0.387
Teacher spread0.276 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designBench or experimental
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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