Sociotechnical Arguments in Scientific Discourse: Expert Depositions in Tobacco Litigation
Bibliographic record
Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION The analysis of the argumentation and rhetoric of scientists during the [Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.] patent trial is more than a discussion of literary devices .... The problems raised during the proceedings and the solutions proposed by expert witnesses were grounded in a seamless web of philosophical, economic, and social distinctions .... [E]xpert witnesses used tools that do not differ, in principle, from tools by philosophers, economists, and sociologists when constructing representations of society.1 Nearly fifteen years ago, three Canadian scholars published a unique study of scientific expertise in a United States courtroom.2 Drawing upon recent work in the sociology of science, the authors demonstrated that one might expect 'technical' arguments to play a central role in patent litigation proceedings, 'social,' 'historical,' 'economic,' or 'philosophical' arguments are coextensive with and constitutive of the 'technical.'3 That is, the interaction between legal and scientific categories should not be viewed as a clash between 'hard scientific facts' and legal conventions or representations, but as a back and forth movement between different kinds of representation.4 More specifically, we should not simply assume that scientists operate within a naturalistic framework that is sometimes translated into an obviously social context-the courtroom, doctrinal categories, or legal discourse. Rather, the discourse of scientists, whether in a laboratory or in a deposition, alternatively includes both naturalistic and social frameworks of explanation. Social, economic, historical, and philosophical arguments, in addition to technical arguments, are often mobilized for rhetorical advantages in scientific disputeseven those disputes that are internal to science and have nothing to do with litigation. This challenges the presumption that law is clearly distinguishable from science insofar as the former is a social and rhetorical enterprise, while the latter is grounded in natural phenomena, not in culture or language. Judging from the number of citations in legal literature to the Cambrosio article, it appears to have had very little impact in law and science studies. A search of the Westlaw legal periodicals database turned up only one reference to the article as an important example of disclosing the hybrid nature of law and science. The citation is followed by a sympathetic observation: Such hybrids often experience difficulty locating and legitimating their knowledge claims in terms of the traditional professional rhetorics of law and science.5 Moreover, in a recent article criticizing the failure of U.S. courts to engage with or even accommodate the history, philosophy, and sociology of science, the authors note that the work of the lead author of the Canadian study, Alberto Cambrosio, is absent from federal-court opinions regarding scientific admissibility.6 Of course, scholarship in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science can easily be conceived as a critique of naive or popular notions of scientific progress, objectivity, or rationality.7 It is perhaps understandable that law-a clearly rhetorical, contested, and interpretive enterprise that seeks stability from science-would idealize science rather than welcome a destabilizing catalogue of its limitations. Representations of science in terms of its historical context, its theoretical commitments to temporary paradigms, or its social supports such as institutions, funding, linguistic conventions, and consensus-building techniques do not seem to provide strong support for our reliance on scientific expertise. Notably, the Cambrosio study was published in Social Problems, not a traditional law review but an interdisciplinary journal. Thus, it is no surprise that the Cambrosio study of scientific expertise in law did not revolutionize the post-Daubert world of evidentiary standards for admissibility of scientific testimony. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.045 | 0.093 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.009 | 0.009 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.032 | 0.071 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.033 | 0.023 |
| Open science | 0.004 | 0.014 |
| Research integrity | 0.028 | 0.014 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.009 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".