Bibliographic record
Abstract
The 1963 to 1989 period witnessed a rapid change in Canadian defence matters. \nDuring this period the Canadian government forced the military away from its traditional \nally the United Kingdom and moved it closer to the United States (US). The Canadian \ngovernments of Lester B. Pearson, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and Brian Mulroney attempted \nto create and retain a distinctive military with a truly ?Canadian? organization and with \nnew Canadian military traditions. However, in the process of attempting to create a \ndistinctive ?Canadian? military, all three of these governments moved the Canadian \nForces (CF) closer towards the US military. While US defence and government officials \nwelcomed an increased defence cooperation between Ottawa and Washington, they were \noften not responsible for the burgeoning ties between the US and Canadian armed forces. \nMoving the CF closer towards their American counterparts enabled Ottawa to keep its \ndefence budget relatively stable without any drastic increases because of the promise of \nsupport from the larger US military. More importantly, this movement towards the US \nenabled all three prime ministers to continuously assure Washington of Canada?s abilities \nto help defend North America and participate in the cooperative NATO defence of \nWestern Europe. Becoming a ?strategic liability? for the US in Western defence would \nhave had grave consequences for Canadian sovereignty. For the Canadian government \nduring this period, the only way to ensure Canada did not become a liability was to have \nthe CF work closely with the US. As a result, Canadian defence policies during the Cold \nWar strove to ensure that Canada was able to participate with the US in the defence of the \nWest.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.028 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.006 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.021 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".