Bibliographic record
Abstract
Who hasn't heard of ecosystem health? It is considered by many to be a useful, perhaps essential, concept in formulating ecological policies. It has an extensive following, especially in the popular media and with advocacy groups (Scrimgeour and Wicklum 1996, Gaudet et al. 1997, Lancaster 2000). Part of its appeal is that it appears to be a simple, straightforward, intuitive metaphor (Ryder 1990, De Leo and Levin 1997). Applying the notion of human health to ecosystems provides a paradigm for viewing ecological policy questions. By implication, adopting the metaphor also defines what types of scientific information are necessary to help decisionmakers (Norton 1995, Meyer 1997, Shrader-Frechette 1997, Lackey 1998). Adopting ecosystem health as a public policy goal, however, could have major, although usually unclear, ramifications. And if Rapport (1995, 1998a, 1998b) and many others are correct, the implications to individuals and society of implementing ecosystem health as a cornerstone of public policy would be considerable, perhaps even revolutionary. The purposes of this article are to evaluate the notion of ecosystem health and to describe the implications of adopting ecosystem health as a goal in ecological policy. Throughout the article, I have attempted to be policy relevant without being a policy advocate. To most proponents of ecosystem health, the alluring feature of the human health metaphor is that people have an inherent understanding of personal health (Ryder 1990). Similarly, and by extension, most people envision a healthy ecosystem (e.g., a forest, lake, or pastoral landscape) as being pristine or at least appearing to be minimally altered by human action. Thus, it is argued, ecosystem health is intuitively grasped by the general public, policy officials, and scientists (Meyer 1997). Most concepts of human health focus on the individual human, whereas ecosystem health treats the entire ecosystem as the unit of policy concern, not the individual animal or plant (Figure 1; Schaeffer et al. 1988). The individual animal or plant—the typical focus of animal rights and animal welfare policy—is not usually the level at which ecological policy is debated. There is no universal conception of ecosystem health; thus, there is considerable variation in the concept's definition (Calow 1992, De Leo and Levin 1997). Karr and Chu (1999), for example, reflect a common but not universal position that concepts of ecosystem health and integrity, although related, are fundamentally different. They define ecosystem health as the preferred state of ecosystems modified by human activity (e.g., farmland, urban environments, airports, managed forests). In contrast, ecosystem integrity is defined as an unimpaired condition in which ecosystems show little or no influence from human actions. Ecosystems with a high degree of integrity are natural, pristine, and often labeled as the baseline or benchmark condition. Natural ecosystems, by definition, would continue to function in essentially the same way if humans were removed (Anderson 1991). Others make no such distinction between the two and may even describe ecosystem health and integrity as different words for the same general concept. Regier (1993), for example, concludes that “the notion of ecosystem integrity is rooted in certain ecological concepts combined with certain sets of human values” and, thus, a desired ecosystem condition “other than the pristine or naturally whole may be taken to be ‘good and normal.’” Hence, according to Regier and many others, if one accepts that there are multiple (and equally acceptable) benchmarks for ecosystems with integrity, then the terms ecosystem health and ecosystem integrity would be conceptually the same. For the remainder of this article, I will use the increasingly popular definitions of ecosystem health and ecosystem integrity advanced by Karr and Chu (1999; described above), whereby the two notions represent different, but related, intellectual constructs. Most ecological policy debates concern ecosystem health rather than ecosystem integrity (Westra 1998). Such an emphasis on health (ecosystems altered by humans) is understandable because the vast majority of ecosystems are not pristine or even close to pristine; hence, according to the definitions used here, altered ecosystems lack at least some integrity (Figure 2). Westra (1998) clearly describes the relationship between the two concepts: An ecosystem can be said to possess integrity when it is wild—that is, free as much as possible from human intervention today, and “unmanaged,” although not necessarily pristine. This aspect of integrity is the most significant one; it is the aspect that differentiates the wild from ecosystem health, which allows support and manipulation. (p. 32) Ecosystem health, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, was defined in nebulous terms—definitely not as a clearly articulated policymaking construct (Steedman 1994, Lancaster 2000). It was typically depicted as a broad societal aspiration rather than a precise policy goal or management target (Rapport 1995). Lacking precise definition, the concept was impractical as a public policy objective. As ecosystem health emerged from semantic ambiguity with more precise definition and description, it became a serious topic for discussion and, predictably, a lightning rod for conflict (Wicklum and Davies 1995, Meyer 1997, Lancaster 2000). Defining and implementing policies on ecosystem health continue to be controversial (Callicott 1995, Jamieson 1995, Wicklum and Davies 1995, Belaoussoff and Kevan 1998). Addressing questions of ecosystem health might appear to be a fairly scholarly, perhaps even arcane, activity, free from the intrigue that dominates much of the science and policy underlying natural resource management, but such is not the case. Ecosystem health is seldom discussed dispassionately because, as Wicklum and Davies (1995) observe: “The phrases ecosystem health and ecosystem integrity are not simply subtle semantic variations on the accepted connotations of the words health and integrity. Health and integrity are not inherent properties of ecosystems” (p. 999). Wicklum and Davies realize that the word health elicits powerful, positive images even if its meaning is variable and ambiguous. Therefore, they argue, a precise understanding of ecosystem health is essential because it is likely to be used and given a variety of meanings by scientists, policy advocates, politicians, bureaucrats, and the general public. In practice, it may fall to scientists and other technocrats to provide operational clarity to the perplexing, value-laden notions of ecosystem health that appeal on an intuitive level to nearly everyone (Meyer 1997). In reality, when value-based ecological concepts such as ecosystem health are generally accepted, they may be useful in general conversation but they are impossible to quantify (Ryder 1990, Lancaster 2000). Ecosystem health and related concepts have become highly charged political terms (Jamieson 1995), often to the extent that they become shorthand for factions in political debates. Even in the relatively isolated venues of academic and government laboratories, an assertion that ecosystem health is not a scientifically sound concept may be sufficient cause for being branded a political reactionary. Conversely, scientists embracing the notion of ecosystem health may be dismissed by fellow scientists as political zealots who use their scientific credentials to champion personal policy preferences. Callicott et al. (1999) characterize debates over the merits of ecosystem health and similar concepts as those in which “partisans of a single normative concept try to make it cannibalize or vanquish all the rest.” Thoughtful discussions about ecosystem health and similar concepts are usually abstract, often contentious, and rarely lead to consensus. But is the use of the health metaphor, even as a heuristic tool, ill-advised? Shrader-Frechette (1997) counseled against using the concept of ecosystem health to communicate with the public about environmental issues because it does not add new information to policy debates, nor does it explain policy tradeoffs. Kapustka and Landis (1998) exhort against using the metaphor because it is misleading and based on values and judgments, not on verifiable scientific reality, whereas Callicott et al. (1999) classify the concept as an “ill-defined normative concept” that reflects the “occurrence of normal ecosystem processes and functions.” Conversely, Callicott (1995) concludes that ecosystem health is intellectually defensible and heuristically valuable, but he concedes that the value, thus the calibration, of ecosystem health is subjective. Few proponents explain in specific terms the implications for individuals and society of basing policies on the concept. Regardless of the merit and direction of the scholarly debate, notions of ecosystem health frame important public policy issues, such as sustainability of agriculture, overuse of marine resources, scarcity of water for domestic and agricultural use, and ecological consequences of introduced species. Ecological policy issues are not mere abstract intellectual concerns, but matters that affect people's daily lives (Shrader-Frechette 1997). A number of implicit, but highly contested, value-based assumptions masquerade as science (Lancaster 2000) in the ecosystem health debate. Such “science” is often dubbed normative science, whereby facts are interpreted through the filter of an assumption that implies an inherent policy preference (Lackey 1999). Many examples of normative science are obvious; others are subtle. An example of the use of normative science in ecosystem health is the long-debated assumption that ecosystems are “real” (Calow 1992, Callicott 1995). Kapustka and Landis (1998) assert that “no human has ever seen an ecosystem” because it is not a discrete unit like individual birds, trees, or worms, or even a population of organisms. However, when a science or policy problem is specified (e.g., a “salmon” issue), then the ecological boundaries (i.e., the ecosystem) follow intuitively. Thus, ecosystems are context-specific entities because they cannot be delimited without a science or policy concern, and therefore they may have heuristic problem solving value but they are not analogous to the patient in medicine (Suter 1993). Although rarely stated clearly, in most formulations of ecosystem health, there is a premise that natural systems are healthier than human-altered systems (Figure 3; Wicklum and Davies 1995). For example, consider a defined geographic location. Given the alternatives of a pristine woodland, a housing subdivision, or an industrial complex, which is the healthiest? The subdivision may be necessary, even somewhat aesthetically pleasing, and the industrial complex may serve a worthy purpose, but almost everyone considers the unaltered woodland to be the healthiest. Tacitly, the assumption is that pristine, or less altered, is good and preferred, whereas highly altered ecosystems, by contrast, are less desirable, if not degraded. Thus, recognizing the normative basis for ecosystem health, Fairbrother (1998) concludes that “use of the term ‘ecosystem health’ as a definition of an idealized state is not an appropriate paradigm.” Another common assumption involves the importance of biological diversity to society. Biological diversity is certainly an important element in understanding the structure and function of ecosystems, but the key policy assumption revolves around the level of importance society places on biological diversity or its constituent elements. For example, some argue that biological diversity is such a core (i.e., societal) policy value that scientists should actively lobby for it. As Meffe and Viederman (1995) bluntly recommend, Scientists can take a clear stand that biodiversity is good, that functioning and intact ecosystems are good, that continued evolutionary change and adaptation are good, and that diversity and variation in general is good. Scientists cannot and should not remove themselves from these usually unstated value judgments. (p. 328) They encourage scientists to drop the facade of political neutrality and lobby for those policy choices that they (scientists) deem to be in the best interests of society (Meffe and Viederman 1995). Invariably, concepts of ecosystem health implicitly assume that certain ecosystem features such as biological diversity have an inherent policy importance (Schaeffer et al. 1988). Ecosystems are complex, typically in both structure and function, and the diversity of species within an ecosystem may be important in determining how that particular ecosystem functions, but biological diversity is inherently no more important to ecosystems than nutrient cycling, carbon storage, or the rate of photosynthesis. As a public policy priority, society collectively may ascribe high (or low) value to preservation of certain, perhaps all, species, based on human values and preferences, without considering biodiversity's ecological function (Lackey 1998). Although not universally agreed upon, a common tacit assumption is that there is a natural ecosystem state (i.e., balance of nature) akin to the simple homoeostatic dynamics of physiological systems (Anderson 1991, Belovsky n.d.). The existence of such a natural state is appealing because disruption of an ecosystem's balance—deviation from its natural state—can be used to define and measure its health. Unfortunately, ecosystems do not adhere to this idealized view. Instead of predictably approaching single-point equilibrium, they may oscillate over time in a fairly indeterminate manner (Belovsky n.d.). Few challenge the assertion that societal preferences should drive the environmental management goals inherent in implementing ecosystem health, but how will societal aspirations be selected (Gaudet et al. 1997, Meyer 1997)? Society is not a monolith; there are many competing opinions on what should be preeminent societal aspirations or preferences. The marketplace, the most common adjudicator of societal preferences, is never totally unconstrained, nor do most participants have much understanding of the long-term ecological consequences of their individual market decisions. Thus, economics has an important role in resolving competing societal preferences, but it is insufficient in itself. Although the language framing ecosystem health is value laden (Jamieson 1995), the values are not easily translated into public policy. The crux of the policy challenge is deciding which of the diverse societal preferences are to be adopted. policy issues of or and and for of will this be for ecosystem health? specific ecological policy Who are the and how should their be used to define ecosystem health? The is relatively when policy are defined such as a particular or a rate for an individual The is more for broad societal aspirations such as ecosystem health. For example, who are the for deciding policy on they or some or all are most by policy about in their but the to thus, urban time may have the political For example, as those most would in being managed for the of Conversely, as all of society would most likely in different policy role should science and scientists in ecosystem health? information is even essential, but it is of what is (Gaudet et al. 1997). Most important ecological policy issues Unfortunately, most scientific information is of a and and thus relevant to many ecological policy questions. political and balance competing values and preferences, a in which the role of scientific information is For the political of over value and preferences, science no or and Landis Lancaster 2000). An is advanced because the of ecosystem health and use of the term societal values and preferences by not an from competing policy In to ecosystem health, the of properties properties with in environmental the for the for and the for by the public, or advocacy (p. Shrader-Frechette (1997) that the does in of to because proponents of ecosystem health have to the precise in which the term scientific those by of and Conversely, Meyer (1997) concludes that the value of ecosystem health is that it a of that is useful for an of policy and The most of ecosystem health is of personal values the of scientific Most concepts of ecosystem health a benchmark (i.e., a preferred of an the or is that an or natural ecosystem is thus preferred, to an altered one (Anderson 1991). An ecosystem altered by human is different from the but there is no scientific basis for a specific ecological state to be considered and thus the and those for scientifically benchmarks for as the benchmark is value free nor or of ecosystem health reflect values and preferences (Gaudet et al. 1997). However, the concept is when usually from based on their preferences, what healthy (i.e., ecosystem to target (Lancaster 2000). Ecosystem health is normative because what ecosystem condition or function is good 1995). Ecosystems no preferences about their thus benchmarks from the individuals the (Jamieson 1995). common is to to serve as the benchmarks (e.g., the best or for the ecosystems in However, Kapustka and Landis (1998) argue that the scientists make in to define healthy ecosystems is and as properties of ecological that biological diversity is inherently to biological diversity is an less is a public policy goal in it ecosystem health to broad political support but the of its there is general public support for the of ecosystem health, but the consequences of such a policy the possible implications for processes or the of Westra for example, stated some political no how it might be of its should be to it does not conflict with the of the of integrity, thus with (p. A but often use of the concept of ecosystem health is policy health a positive the common in policy debates is to the high by policy choices are necessary for health and those of lead to or ecosystem all, the competing policy by definition, not be appropriate for ecosystem health. choices are rarely For example, a policy to a to a might be as appropriate to ecosystem health. the or could be on the societal preferences are often of the concept of ecosystem health. those for controversial policy may be to define their goals clearly, they ecosystem health in the that it is a scientifically operational the of the health metaphor in environmental management, this are the of the and the of into specific to or properties of Hence, the to ecosystem health as a goal is not a of (p. Kapustka and Landis (1998) against using normative concepts such as ecosystem are to the it should be with the clear that choices will have to be not by or Ecological policy issues, such as human use, biological diversity or the of use, are and serious by society 2000). concepts from normative science can be but even many proponents that there are serious or operational with such the intuitive heuristic value of the ecosystem health its clearly implications to be (Scrimgeour and Wicklum But if are the The most to using normative science is to using words such as ecosystem health and simply and clearly describe what is rather than an a for health, policy proponents should and clearly the public policy and management objective. A to using ecosystem health is to ecological policy issues as complex public policy and not on policy issues, such as and are also complex and but heuristic or are not typically used in political a notion of ecosystem health is to be used in implementing ecological then definitions should be used 1997). there are often definitions of ecosystem health, on the meaning is essential to policy on societal not semantic should be the of using normative concepts because those concepts inherent value judgments. (1998) a science with and whereas society with good and can the and describe the that is likely to from a but it cannot if the is good or (p. Thus, policy are normative by definition, because values and preferences are used by decisionmakers to a particular has become much more than a scholarly it has simply understanding of Many of ecosystem typically have a normative and As The science of has a popular that of other academic of the of the word it has in the most places and the most on in and on It has the language of and in a number of are political groups that are as (p. The role of normative science, and ecosystem health, is the there are argue that using normative science in such as ecosystem health is desirable, even essential, for implementing ecological policy. they have an to policy value into even to the that such concepts as ecosystem health should be as the cornerstone of ecological policy (Callicott 1995). scientific and (e.g., normative science as the core of their that biological diversity is inherently good, of and species is inherently ecological is inherently good, is good, and biological diversity has value however, assert that normative such as ecosystem health, a of science and the necessary and policy choices often societal values and Landis Lancaster 2000). In it is not the role of science to choices that society should but to help and the consequences of choices (Meyer 1997). Scientists and scientific information continue to an important role in resolving ecological but the in should be (Lackey 1999). even within the of scientists, has more as a than a It is perhaps even for scientists to in ecological policy debates by personal values and policy preferences as “science” 1995). the values and preferences of society is to implementing concepts of ecosystem health, but such understanding is To however, that concepts of ecosystem health are scientific is As (1995) “The that scientific in general or of ecosystem health in particular are value is simply The likely to public is that the values of scientists and other technocrats will be used as for societal values and preferences. The ecological policy that over ecosystem health and other normative will not to be because of the on ecological et al. 1997). The of ecological policy is likely to become increasingly because the the and the human population a of increasingly 1997). or not one intellectual in the notion of ecosystem health, the policy its proponents to are This was when I was a at the of This article from many often discussions I have with in and the are the individuals who of this and their and and ecosystem health focus sets the for a new environmental in which may be by their to or the health of the ecosystem” (Rapport 1995). ecosystem health a goal with importance to ecosystem health, the of and systems are (Rapport “The of ecosystem health goals and of to these goals is a if the for is to be (Rapport
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.005 | 0.008 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.012 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".