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Record W2255060777 · doi:10.1111/ijet.12079

Goethe's secret reserve price

2016· article· en· W2255060777 on OpenAlexaff
Charles Z. Zheng

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Journal of Economic Theory · 2016
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsWestern University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSecrecyMechanism (biology)EconomicsPrivate information retrievalMicroeconomicsContrast (vision)Mathematical economicsBusinessPhilosophyComputer scienceComputer securityEpistemology

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract The story in which Goethe sold a manuscript through a secret reserve price is revisited. Goethe's choice of secrecy can be explained as an attempt to mitigate the lemons problem through concealing his private information about the manuscript. The standard mechanisms that make the price public are unsafe for the seller as the buyer may adopt non‐trusting posterior beliefs. A safe inscrutable mechanism is constructed here that generates more expected profits for some seller types than any such standard mechanism. A contrast between this mechanism and the one devised by Goethe explains why his mechanism was corrupted during its execution.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.241
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0020.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0080.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.077
GPT teacher head0.407
Teacher spread0.330 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2016
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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