Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper challenges the consensus view that elective provisions in the tax law are necessary evils by proposing a novel account of tax elections as screening devices. To illustrate the mechanics of screening, it describes a fictional tax election that perfectly separates taxpayers of one type (honest compliers) from taxpayers of the second type (dishonest evaders). Building on this illustration, the paper applies the theory of screening to the most common tax election in the United States tax context: the election to itemize one’s tax-deductible expenses. I argue that a taxpayer’s choice to itemize can help reveal important taxpayer attributes, particularly when analyzed alongside other available tax return data. These attributes include the taxpayer’s earning ability, her responsiveness to taxes, and her propensity to voluntarily comply with the tax law. At bottom, this paper stands for the proposition that tax elections are low-hanging informational fruit. Even if many existing tax elections may not survive cost-benefit scrutiny in a future policy overhaul, they can be used to help policymakers and tax administrators harvest efficiency gains from our tax system at zero cost to redistributive equity.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.014 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.018 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".