Racial Equality Bill: Japanese proposal at Paris Peace Conference : diplomatic manoeuvres and reasons for rejection
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Japan as an ally of Britain, since the signing of Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, entered World War One at British request. During the Great War Japan fought Germany in Asia and afforded protection to Australia. After the conclusion of the War, a peace conference was held at Paris in 1919. As a victorious ally and as one of the Five Great Powers of the day, Japan participated at the Paris Peace Conference, and proposed racial equality to be enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This Racial Equality Bill, despite the tireless efforts of the Japanese delegates who engaged the representatives of other countries in intense diplomatic negotiations, was rejected. The rejection, a debatable issue ever since, has inspired many explanations including the theory that it was a deliberate Japanese ploy to achieve other goals in the agenda. This thesis has researched the reasons for rejection and contends that the rejection was not due to any one particular reason. Four key factors: a) resolute opposition from Australian Prime Minister Hughes determined to protect White Australia Policy, b) lack of British support, c) lack of US support, and d) lack of support from the British dominions of New Zealand, Canada and South Africa; converged to defeat the Japanese proposal. Japanese inexperience in international diplomacy evident from strategic and tactical mistakes, their weak presentations and communications, and enormous delays in negotiations, at Paris, undermined Japan's position at the conference, but the reasons for rejection of the racial equality proposal were extrinsic.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.025 | 0.052 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.027 | 0.008 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.016 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.007 | 0.013 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".