MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2272597224

A Nonparametric Test of Exogenous Participation in First-Price Auctions

2014· preprint· en· W2272597224 on OpenAlexaff
Paul Nianqing Liu, Yao Luo

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2014
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionNonparametric statisticsValuation (finance)EconometricsMonte Carlo methodEconomicsStatistical hypothesis testingMathematicsStatisticsMicroeconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper proposes a nonparametric test of exogenous participation in first-price auctions. Exogenous participation means that the valuation distribution does not depend on the number of bidders. Our test is motivated by the fact that two valuation distributions are the same if and only if their generalized Lorenz curves are the same. Our method avoids estimating unobserved valuations and does not require smooth estimation of bid density. We show that our test is consistent against all fixed alternatives and has power against root-n local alternatives. Monte Carlo experiments show that our test performs well in finite samples. We implement our method on data from the U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. We also discuss how our test can be adapted to other testing problems in auctions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.009
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.015
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMetaresearch
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.324
Threshold uncertainty score0.993

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0090.015
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0020.002
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.116
GPT teacher head0.424
Teacher spread0.308 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2014
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueRePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207