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Record W2280306538 · doi:10.1093/cybsec/tyv003

Tipping the scales: the attribution problem and the feasibility of deterrence against cyberattack

2015· article· en· W2280306538 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Cybersecurity · 2015
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicCybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
Canadian institutionsUniversity of TorontoGlobal Affairs Canada
FundersOffice of Naval ResearchU.S. Department of Defense
KeywordsAttributionPunishment (psychology)Value (mathematics)Computer securityDeterrence theoryDenialDeceptionDeterrence (psychology)OffensiveLaw and economicsEvasion (ethics)Social psychologyEconomicsPsychologyPolitical scienceLawComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Cyber attackers rely on deception to exploit vulnerabilities and obfuscate their identity, which makes many pessimistic about cyber deterrence. The attribution problem appears to make retaliatory punishment, contrasted with defensive denial, particularly ineffective. Yet observable deterrence failures against targets of lower value tell us little about the ability to deter attacks against higher value targets, where defenders may be more willing and able to pay the costs of attribution and punishment. Counterintuitively, costs of attribution and response may decline with scale. Reliance on deception is a double-edged sword that provides some advantages to the attacker but undermines offensive coercion and creates risks for ambitious intruders. Many of the properties of cybersecurity assumed to be determined by technology, such as the advantage of offense over defense, the difficulty of attribution, and the inefficacy of deterrence, are in fact consequences of political factors like the value of the target and the scale-dependent costs of exploitation and retaliation. Assumptions about attribution can be incorporated into traditional international relations concepts of uncertainty and credibility, even as attribution involves uncertainty about the identity of the opponent, not just interests and capabilities. This article uses a formal model to explain why there are many low-value anonymous attacks but few high-value ones, showing how different assumptions about the scaling of exploitation and retaliation costs lead to different degrees of coverage and effectiveness for deterrence by denial and punishment. Deterrence works where it is needed most, yet it usually fails everywhere else.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScience and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Qualitative · Consensus signal: Qualitative
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.222
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.003
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.067
GPT teacher head0.340
Teacher spread0.273 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it