Bibliographic record
Abstract
Canadian natural gas deregulation has terminated government price setting in favour of prices determined by market forces. However, the transportation of the commodity remains regulated due to the monopolistic nature of the distribution system and the Canadian economies of scale which preclude business rivalry. This paper attempts to discern whether the transition to a new regime is following the legal principles underlying public utility regulation. Promotion of the public interest is therefore a pervasive theme of this paper. While regulatory law allows certain forms of discrimination in the setting of rates and the provision of services, it prohibits undue or unjust discrimination. The thesis proposed herein focuses on regulatory theory and the possibility that incidents of undue discrimination may have been exacerbated by the deregulation process. The examination begins with a review of the discrimination provisions of section 92A of the Constitution Act 1867, the so-called "Resource Amendment". More attention is directed to public utilities theory given its compelling application to the natural gas industry. Deregulation is then discussed including an analysis of "direct sale" contracts involving the commodity as well as the "bypass" of the local pipeline distribution systems. Some conclusions are then made concerning competition and changing commercial conditions. Grave doubts are voiced as to whether the National Energy Board is properly applying the principles of public utility regulation during the transition to a more market oriented natural gas environment. One important conclusion is that direct sale contracts should be encouraged in the core market as well as in the industrial market by the National Energy Board in order to promote upstream competition among gas producers in the public interest. Finally, it is hoped that these doubts will be resolved by the Board in its new (RH-1-88) public hearing which will address issues related to deregulation, including direct sales and the ancillary self-displacement and operating demand volume (ODV) methodology.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".